The Achilles Heel of Nuclear Policy
[The Liberation Day Countdown resumes! ……L-Day minus 7,335…………. After nearly a one-year hiatus, during which your chronicaler has moved from Manila to Stockholm and become a senior advisor to NoFirstUse.Global.]
President Reagan first formulated the dictum that, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” At his next meeting with President Gorbachev, they jointly promulgated that same dictum. The common interpretation of the dictum is that, whatever or whoever triggers it, nuclear war is a lose-lose proposition, and thus cannot be the basis for rational policy making. It is worth noting that the nuclear-use policies of China and India not to initiate nuclear warfare conform to this dictum.
The question is: how are policies that allow for — indeed threaten — the initiation of nuclear warfare in any way consistent with “must never be fought”?
The answer would appear to be that the lose-lose interpretation is not how the other nuclear powers look at the dictum. And, deviously, they have a point.
Note more closely that the dictum actually says that nuclear war is a not-win — not-win proposition. So, is there a distinction to be made between not-win and lose?
Yes, if one interprets not-win as closer to not-lose than lose. How so? Follow me down this rabbit’s hole!
First stop: “last resort”. If the chips are down, the threat of use of nuclear weapons can signal that you are prepared to throw over the entire table. If that signal is ignored or dismissed as a bluff, then you escalate to nuclear warfare in the (faint) hope that your adversary will stop pressing his advantage and be satisfied with what he has already gained. If (big if) this works, you haven’t won, but you also have not lost. (If you’re hit back — as deterrence promises — you’ve achieved worse than nothing.)
Second stop: “no matter what anyone says, when push comes to shove, they will resort”. So much has been invested in nuclear arms, that accepting defeat while your nuclear arsenal just continues to gather dust is politically untenable. So, if threatening last-resort use slightly decreases the risk of being boxed into a last-resort situation in the first place, then it’s worth the risk.
Third stop: “While we’re at it, maybe first-use threats can pay off even when it’s not a matter of last-resort.” I am not over interpreting here. In January 2022, the P5 reiterated the dictum, but went on, without so much as a pause, to say:
“As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons — for as long as they continue to exist — should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”
If you are determined not to fight a nuclear war, how can nuclear weapons play any role beyond deterring nuclear war? The “answer” appears to be by, nonetheless, threatening it. But if you aren’t going to fight it, then the threat is a bluff, pure and simple. For the bluff to be of any value, you are counting on your adversary being gullible.
But if your adversary is running the same bluff on you, is anyone really fooled?
Less than six weeks after the P5 statement, President Putin made a mockery of it, by combining his invasion of Ukraine with a threat to resort to nuclear arms if NATO tried to thwart his conquest of Ukraine. In justification of this stance, it was argued that Ukraine becoming part of NATO would be tantamount to creating a last resort situation for Russia. So the offensive action served a “defensive purpose”; the aggression “deterred aggression”; and all this “prevented war” between the great powers.
Fast forward to the 2022 G20 summit in Bali and a new nuclear dictum: “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.” While the West was happy to use this stance to berate Russia, Russia simply let it slide. But here is the full paragraph which contains the eleven words (highlighted):
“It is essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability. This includes defending all the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and adhering to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and infrastructure in armed conflicts. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. The peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, are vital. Today’s era must not be of war.”
Note that the specific case of Ukraine doesn’t feature at all. Indeed, each sentence addresses a universal value. This created a problem for the nuclear powers whose policies allow for first use. A year later at the 2023 Delhi summit, the G20 reiterated the eleven words, but in a way that focused on (Russia’s) explicit threats of use:
— as if threatening, “Don’t cross this red line or I’ll nuke you.” was a no-no, but
— as if warning: “You should be aware that, should you cross one of my red lines, I have options, one of which is nuking you.” was OK.
It’s a distinction lacking a difference.
Rather than tie itself further in knots, the 2024 G20 simply reverted to its original economic-social focus and eschewed security issues altogether.
“Doublespeak! Nothing new here. Suck it up!”
Indeed, none of this would matter, IF the first-use policies were for real and made a modicum of sense. But they aren’t and they don’t. In short, an Achilles Heel has been exposed and we should be aiming straight at it. People have a fundamental right to assurances that nuclear policy is not just bluff and bluster. Otherwise, nuclear war could occur before we have the chance to abolish it.
Please take a moment to listen to this voice of reason from 1947. See if you can guess (before getting to the end) who’s speaking to us from the infancy of the Nuclear Age.
“.. nothing has been done to avert war, while much has been done to make atomic war more horrible; so there is no excuse for ignoring the danger. I say [“nothing”], despite the proposal for [international monitoring]* of atomic energy put forward by the United States in the United Nations. This country has made only a conditional proposal, and on conditions which the Soviet Union is now determined not to accept. This makes it possible to blame the failure on the Russians.
But in blaming the Russians, the Americans should not ignore the fact that they themselves have not voluntarily renounced the use of the bomb as an ordinary weapon in the time before the achievement of [international monitoring], or if [international monitoring] is not achieved. Thus they have fed the fear of other countries that they consider the bomb a legitimate part of their arsenal so long as other countries decline to accept their terms for [international monitoring].
Americans may be convinced of their determination not to launch an aggressive or preventive war. So they may believe it is superfluous to announce publicly that they will not a second time be the first to use the atomic bomb. But this country has been solemnly invited to renounce the use of the bomb — that is, to outlaw it — and has declined to do so unless its terms for [international monitoring] are accepted.
I believe this policy is a mistake. I see a certain military gain from not renouncing the use of the bomb in that this may be deemed to restrain another country from starting a war in which the United States might use it. But what is gained in one way is lost in another. For an understanding over the [international monitoring] of atomic energy has been made more remote. That may be no military drawback so long as the United States has the exclusive use of the bomb. But the moment another country is able to make it in substantial quantities, the United States loses greatly through the absence of an international agreement, because of the vulnerability of its concentrated industries and its highly developed urban life.
In refusing to outlaw the bomb while having the monopoly of it, this country suffers in another respect, in that it fails to return publicly to the ethical standards of warfare formally accepted previous to [World War II]. It should not be forgotten that the atomic bomb was made in this country as a preventive measure; it was to head off its use by the Germans, if they discovered it. The bombing of civilian centers was initiated by the Germans and adopted by the Japanese. To it the Allies responded in kind — as it turned out, with greater effectiveness — and they were morally justified in doing so. But now, without any provocation, and without the justification of reprisal or retaliation, a refusal to outlaw the use of the bomb save in reprisal is making a political purpose of its possession; this is hardly pardonable.
I am not saying that the United States should not manufacture and stockpile the bomb, for I believe that it must do so; it must be able to deter another nation from making an atomic attack when it also has the bomb. [… The US] should have the bomb for the sole purpose of deterring an aggressor or rebellious nations from making an atomic attack. It should not use the atomic bomb on its own initiative any more than … any other power should do so. To keep a stockpile of atomic bombs without promising not to initiate its use is exploiting the possession of bombs for political ends. It may be that the United States hopes in this way to frighten the Soviet Union into accepting [international monitoring] of atomic energy. But the creation of fear only heightens antagonism and increases the danger of war. …
We have emerged from a war in which we had to accept the degradingly low ethical standards of the enemy. But instead of feeling liberated from his standards, and set free to restore the sanctity of human life and the safety of noncombatants, we are in effect making the low standards of the enemy in the last war our own for the present. Thus we are starting toward another war degraded by our own choice.
It may be that the public is not fully aware that in another war atomic bombs will be available in large quantities. It may measure the dangers in the terms of the three bombs exploded before the end of the last war. The public also may not appreciate that, in relation to the damage inflicted, atomic bombs already have become the most economical form of destruction that can be used on the offensive. In another war the bombs will be plentiful and they will be comparatively cheap. Unless there is a determination not to use them that is stronger than can be noted today among American political and military leaders, and on the part of the public itself, atomic warfare will be hard to avoid. Unless Americans come to recognize that they are not stronger in the world because they have the bomb, but weaker because of their vulnerability to atomic attack, they are not likely to conduct … their relations with Russia in a spirit that furthers the arrival at an understanding.”
Albert Einstein
*NOTE: I have taken the liberty of substituting “international monitoring” for “supranational control”. Einstein was an advocate of world government; a most worthy objective, but not a necessary condition for establishing a robust nuclear weapon free world.
